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A Re-evaluation of Generalship 
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds 
and Major-General George Kitching 
in Normandy 1944 
Angelo Caravaggio 
Major-General George Kitching was General Officer Commanding 4 th Canad ian 
Armoured Division from February until August 
1944. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, 
commander of 2nd Canadian Corps to which 
4th Canadian Armoured Division belonged, 
relieved Kitching of command on 21 August, 
ostensibly for lack of leadership. The story of 
Major-General Kitching and 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division in Normandy has so far not 
been portrayed in an especially positive light. 
Most scholarship, including the official history 
of the Canadian Army, accepts that Simonds was 
justified in relieving Kitching from command. 
Criticism from contemporary American and 
British commanders, repeated by subsequent 
historians, claimed that attacks by 2nd Canadian 
Corps, with the object of closing the Falaise Gap, 
were not pressed forward with sufficient resolve 
and thereby resulted in the escape of some 
quarter million German soldiers.1 The "poor" 
performance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
in general, and the supposed lacklustre 
command performance of Kitching in particular, 
have been convenient explanations for this 
failure. Simonds viewed the case as one of 
leadership potential that was never achieved by 
Kitching. The expectation was that the Canadians 
should have been more successful in Operations 
"Totalize" and "Tractable" and that 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division, as the spearhead for the 
Canadian advance, should have closed the 
Falaise Gap sooner. John English even goes so 
far as to state that the lacklustre performance 
of the Canadian army in Normandy laid squarely 
at the feet of the divisional commanders.2 
Is this assessment valid? George Kitching 
tried to do his duty as a general. He tried to win 
the battles he was ordered to fight and he tried 
to prepare his men as best he could for the 
battles they would have to fight in Normandy. 
He was prevented from accomplishing both 
objectives by his superior Guy Simonds. Taking 
a more multi-disciplinary approach to the 
question reveals that the command relationship 
between Simonds and Kitching was beset with 
serious problems. The personal performance of 
Kitching as General Officer Commanding 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division was a direct result 
of being forced to operate in what Ross Pigeau 
and Carol McCann describe as a compromised 
command environment and the result ing 
emotional and physical strain that this situation 
placed on him personally.3 This command 
environment, created by Simonds, was derived 
from the corps commander's mistrust of his 
subordinate divisional commanders after his 
failed attacks of July. Simonds decided he would 
maintain greater control and in so doing, 
stripped his divisional commanders of their 
command au thor i ty . Kitching was not 
responsible for the resulting compromised 
command environment, but he was forced to 
command his division within it until 21 August. 
Lack of sleep, combined with the stresses of 
sustained combat and the high casualties in the 
August 1944 battles, sapped what was left of 
Kitching's capacity to command effectively at the 
divisional level under Simonds. 
James Jay Carafano, in his book After 
D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy 
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Major-General George Kitching and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds. 
Breakout, observes:" We do not write the history 
of what happened but the history of the records 
that remain."4 The statement underscores the 
limitations of writing operational and tactical 
history from the existing primary source 
material, which in many cases is woefully 
deficient. Most war diaries of the units and 
regiments of 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
are incomplete and in some cases, totally 
missing. The state of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division's war diary itself is of part icular 
concern. It appears that existing documents for 
July and August were rebuilt after the fact. The 
incompleteness of the July and August 1944 
diaries when compared to the diaries before and 
after those months and the fact that Major-
General Harry Foster signed off the diary for July 
1944 are somewhat worrisome. Foster took 
command of 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
on 21 August after Kitching was relieved of 
command. Kitching had signed 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division war diary entries from 
February 1944, when he assumed command, to 
June 1944 and his signature should therefore 
have appeared on the July 1944 entry. The 
crucial documents that would have shed light 
on the activities, conversations, and orders by 
Kitching are the armoured command vehicle 
logs, but these are missing entirely. Without these 
logs, it is almost impossible to track Kitching's 
personal activities. Donald Graves asked 
Kitching about these logs in an interview, and 
Kitching seemed surprised that they were not 
available, thus implying that they did exist at 
one t ime. The exist ing pr imary sources 
documenting 4th Canadian Armoured Division's 
activities during August 1944 are neither 
consistent nor reliable. 
Most secondary sources support Simonds 
and his decision to relieve Kitching. In fact, other 
than one paragraph at the end of Chapter 14, in 
his book Mud and Green Fields, Kitching fails 
to come to his own defence.5 Surprisingly, the 
battles of "Totalize" and "Tractable" are not 
discussed in any great detail inside the book. 
Kitching told me during a 1990 tour of the 
Normandy battles that the manuscript for his 
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memoirs was actually much longer than that 
actually published. Given Kitching's close 
association with Simonds and his actions once 
relieved of command, Kitching probably would 
have not criticised Simonds in any way had there 
been further discussions of these battles. 
Kitching receives timid support in Reginald Roy's 
book 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, which 
provides a detailed account of the Canadian 
actions and Kitching's troubles.6 Nonetheless, 
Roy leaves readers to decide whether or not 
Kitching was fairly treated. Donald Graves' South 
Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War and 
J o h n Marte inson 's The Royal Canadian 
Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History have 
cast different lights on the events of August 1944, 
and to some extent, on what happened to 
Kitching.7 They have uncovered cer ta in 
fragments of information, which become 
important in this reassessment. Notwith-
standing, historians have generally accepted 
Simonds' dismissal of Kitching without question 
or any detailed assessment of Kitching's side of 
the story. Any reconsideration of the command 
relationship between Simonds and Kitching, 
resulting in the latter's dismissal, requires 
careful and critical reading of the war diaries 
from 1st Canadian Army and 2nd Canadian 
Corps in light of new information presented by 
Graves and Marteinson. 
Among the principal problems with the 
l i t e ra tu re as a whole is the seemingly 
indiscriminant interchanging of the names of 
Simonds and Kitching in describing 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division's battles during 
August. In certain texts, Simonds is credited for 
giving a specific order, while in 
others it was Kitching who gave the 
order. An example is the decision to 
re-route 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division units over a secondary 
bridge when initial at tempts to 
exploit beyond Damblainville failed 
on 17 August. The actual decision 
to change the plan and redirect the 
attack speaks highly of the ability of 
t ha t commander to a s s e s s 
The Pigeau/McCann Command 
and Control model. 
accurately and react properly to the conditions 
on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the existing 
literature leaves a confused picture as to who 
actually made the decision to reroute the 4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade's forces. The most 
probable scenario is that Kitching recommended 
the change and Simonds approved. What is clear 
from the l i terature is that Kitching, as a 
divisional commander, lacked the latitude to 
change a Simonds plan once it had been issued, 
even when it involved movement within his own 
divisional boundaries. 
Another problem with the accepted history 
is the lack of a proper measurement tool to 
evaluate the command environment within 
which Kitching and the other Canadian 
divisional c o m m a n d e r s u n d e r S imonds 
operated. In order to offer a valid assessment of 
Kitching as a commander, an examination of his 
command env i ronment is e s sen t i a l . A 
measurement tool for assessing or quantifying 
a command environment has only recently 
become available with development of the Pigeau/ 
McCann Command and Control model.8 The 
model provides a workable definition of 
command and control that can then be used to 
guide policy and doctrine. The model represents 
a rich tool for the assessment of commanders 
and their command environment. It includes two 
components that are critical to this evaluation, 
the Command, Authority Responsibility (CAR) 
space and what is referred to as the Balanced 
Command Envelop (BCE). 
The model examines the relat ionship 
be tween competency, au tho r i ty and 
3
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responsibility within a three dimensional space 
resulting in a four-quadrant matrix. The four 
quadrants are called dangerous command, 
maximal (balanced) command, minimal 
(balanced) command and ineffectual command. 
The quadran t of specific concern in this 
investigation is ineffectual command. Within 
ineffectual command lies a state known as 
compromised command . Compromised 
command is characterized as an acceptance of 
high levels of responsibility on the part of the 
commander without commensurately high levels 
of authority being given. Responsibility has been 
taken; however, power over resources has not 
Compromised Command Environment. 
been assigned nor has any clear mandate to act 
been authorized. 
Ineffectual command undermines the very 
purpose of a military. Without authority, a 
commander is powerless to accomplish the 
mission properly, yet can feel responsible for not 
having done so. Without sufficient authority, 
commanders are seriously compromised in their 
missions, and worse, the individuals filling the 
command positions are at a t remendous 
psychological d isadvantage. 9 This set of 
circumstances provides an accurate description 
of the position in which Kitching found himself 
during the latter half of August 1944. The Pigeau/ 
McCann model predicts the compromised 
command environment and details the likely 
r e su l t s of the exis tence of th is type of 
environment. In the case of Kitching, the model 
proves amazingly accurate. 
The last element of the measurement 
equation is success. Success in battle is usually 
the primary measurement tool for a battlefield 
commander. But what is the definition of success 
and more particularly, success at what cost? As 
Jack Granatstein states in The Generals, even 
good commanders cannot be expected to win 
every battle, and since Canada possessed few 
experienced commanders, those who were 
removed from command tended to be replaced 
by someone less experienced.10 General Omar 
Bradley, in his book A Soldier's Story, states 
that during the Argentan-Falaise battle, General 
George Patton measured his successes in miles 
gained, while General Courtney Hodges 
measured success in enemy dead.11 Kitching's 
measurement tool was time, namely the time 
required to close the Falaise Gap. 
Lack of Allied success in June and July, 
combined with the doctrinal preference for set-
piece attacks, shaped the command paradigm 
that Simonds would establish for the August 
battles. Each of the set piece battles of June and 
July failed to meet stated objectives; yet, 
Simonds clung to this style of command and 
perpetuated it during the month of August with 
the same results. It appears that the most 
important lesson Simonds took away from the 
setbacks of June and July, particularly after 
Operation "Spring," was that he could not trust 
the tactical acumen of his Canadian infantry 
divisional commanders.12 Simonds' solution was 
to exercise tighter control in future operations. 
This tighter control led to the detailed operation 
plans for the upcoming Corps operations 
"Totalize" and "Tractable." 
Bill McAndrew has described the Simonds 
command environment as one where higher 
headquarters produced detailed plans for lower 
formations and units to implement. These plans 
often resulted in centralized planning, control 
at the highest level, staff management of the 
battlefield, reliance on indirect fire support, little 
consideration to the concept of maneuver, and 
cautious exploitation. This formula usually 
resulted in units attacking an enemy's strength 
rather than trying to outflank them. There was 
8 
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little room for flexibility, initiative, originality, or 
the modification of the plan to meet the emerging 
demands of the battlefield.13 If the plan failed, 
the blame was always pushed downwards to the 
units and commanders involved. In some 
respects, fighting the enemy became secondary 
to executing the plan. Simonds typically believed 
that his plans were never the problem. Rather, 
it was the execution of his plans by his 
s u b o r d i n a t e s t ha t r e su l t ed in fai lure. 
Nonetheless, a British report discussed the 
problematical nature of the plans and their 
implementation: 
Our own tactical methods are thorough and 
methodical but slow and cumbersome. In 
consequence, our troops fight well in defence 
and our set-piece attacks are usually successful, 
but it is not unfair to say that through lack of 
enterprise in exploitation, we seldom reap the 
full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious, 
we over-insure administratively, we are by nature 
too apprehensive of failure and our training 
makes us more so.14 
Application of the Pigeau/ McCann model to 
the Simonds-Kitching command relationship 
reveals t ha t the command and control 
framework established by Simonds created an 
environment in which Kitching, as a divisional 
commander, actually had little in the way of 
command authority over how his division was 
employed in Normandy. The Simonds' command 
paradigm focused on controlling the command 
creativity of his divisional commanders . 
Competency, authority and responsibility were 
not ba lanced; as a resu l t , effective 
"commandership" on the part of the divisional 
commanders was impossible. By giving his 
commanders detailed instructions down to 
brigade level and sometimes below, Simonds 
minimized the authority of the divisional 
commanders. There was little or no room for 
initiative or flexibility from his subordinate 
commanders on the battlefield. Kitching was the 
divisional commander with the corresponding 
legal authority and responsibility, but he was 
never allowed to exercise freely his ability or 
skills in command. The key component was 
Kitching's lack of actual command authority. 
The detailed p lans of "Totalize" and 
"Tractable," followed by the tasking of divisions 
by Montgomery and brigades by Simonds in the 
Falaise Gap battles, are clear examples of 
Montgomery and Simonds u su rp ing the 
commonly understood authority of the divisional 
commander. This problem constitutes the core 
of the compromised command environment. 
Kitching was literally forced to the sidelines; his 
only function was to convey the continuing 
stream of conflicting orders from Simonds who 
was personally struggling to cope with a type of 
battlefield he could not handle. This fact is made 
clear in a telling summary of a series of 
conversations between Simonds and the Chief 
of Staff 1st Canadian Army, Brigadier Churchill 
Mann, recorded in the 1st Canadian Army 
Operations Log Group between 1040 hours and 
1140 hours on 19 August. During the course of 
these conversations, Simonds stated that he was 
A Sherman tank of the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division near Cintheaux, France, 8 August 1944. 
about to leave for a meeting with his divisional 
commanders, but he did not have a clear idea 
as to how he should operate "during today and 
in the immediate future." Mann endeavoured to 
obtain direction from Crerar or Montgomery. 
The Chief of Staff 21st Army Group stated that 
he had not been in touch with Montgomery, but 
that in his opinion, the instructions would direct 
2nd Canadian Corps to continue to close the Gap 
and keep it closed until 2nd British Army was 
able to take over the task.15 It is evident that 
despite his tactical genius, Simonds was having 
difficulty orchestrating 2nd Canadian Corps' 
response to the fluid and confusing nature of 
the Falaise Gap battles. This difficulty also 
explains the nature of the constantly changing 
orders issued by Simonds. 
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The problem was t h a t Kitching, not 
Simonds, was charged with responsibility and 
authority to command 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division. Pigeau and McCann argue that without 
such authority, a commander is powerless to 
properly accomplish the mission, yet can feel 
responsible for not having done so. Without 
sufficient authority, commanders are seriously 
compromised in their missions, and worse, the 
individuals filling the command positions are 
at a tremendous psychological disadvantage.16 
There is no doubt that Kitching knew he had to 
succeed and felt the psychological pressure to 
do so. His answer to this pressure was to drive 
himself harder which drove him into a state of 
physical and mental exhaustion. 
deprivation becomes important in the analysis 
of Kitching and helps to explain, in part, a 
number of anomalies in his actions during the 
closing of the Falaise Gap. 
Studies carried out during simulated 
armoured and mechanized infantry operations 
at the US National Training Center (NTC) in the 
Mojave desert of Southern California involving 
battalion-sized task forces, and consisting of 14 
days of force-on-force and live-fire exercises 
observed that sleep was brief and fragmented. 
Notable in this study was the clear correlation 
between sleep and rank. Whereas personnel at 
the squad and crew level averaged between 7-8 
hours of sleep each night, those at battalion and 
Photo by Ken Bell, NAC PA 1136' 
Tanks of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division preparing to advance nearTilly-la-Campagne, 8 August 1944. 
The combat/operational environment is 
demanding, both physically and mentally. 
Commanders, to be effective, must grasp 
complex, rapidly evolving, and often ambiguous 
situations and react to them. While a commander 
has an obligation towards the welfare of those 
under his command, there is also the obligation 
to look after his own well-being in order to 
ensure his performance in combat; it comprises 
the interplay between command responsibility 
and personal responsibility. Command failure 
will result in unit failure, wounded, dead, and 
for the survivors the possibility of long term 
physical and mental disability. A new area of 
research dealing with these issues is evolving, 
entitled self-care. Self-care, ranges from 
changing one's socks through ensuring that one 
gets adequate amounts of sleep which helps 
s u s t a i n an individual and hence un i t 
effectiveness in opera t iona l se t t ings . 1 7 
Understanding the effects of sleep and sleep 
brigade level averaged little more than 4 hours 
of sleep each night. From the perspective of sleep 
and its effects on performance, it would be 
expected that personnel at the lower echelons 
would be more effective than individuals in the 
higher echelons. The study confirmed this 
prediction. Junior personnel improved their 
performance over the course of the exercise, with 
the more senior, higher echelon personnel 
entering into a state known as "droning."18 The 
tests revealed that the higher the echelon of 
command and control, the greater the sleep 
deprivation. Accumulated data has shown that 
7-8 hours of sleep per night is required to sustain 
high levels of performance over days and weeks. 
The problem is that continuous combat is 
characterized by brief, fragmented sleep, which 
has little or no recuperative value. This 
realization accounts for the common practice of 
routinely rotating combat units out of the line 
into rest areas. 
10 
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The tests also revealed that 
sleep deprivation (SD) in the 
higher echelons of command 
and control was greatest in the 
force-on-force phase, the most 
realistic simulation of combat. 
The ability to perform a simple 
task (i.e. to lay cross-hairs on 
a target and squeeze rounds 
off accurately) remained intact 
but the ability to perform more 
complex cognitive (thinking) 
operations, and thus to be 
oriented to and have a grasp 
of the tactical situation was 
lost.19 Recent findings reveal 
that sleep deprivation impairs 
mood, alertness, and cognitive 
performance and in general 
degrades complex cognitive 
performance. Laboratory 
studies have revealed that 
mental work declines by as 
much as 25% during each 
success ive 24 h o u r s of 
continuous wakefulness. The 
Canad ian Forces m a n u a l 
Command states that after 18 
hours of sustained operations, 
logical reasoning degrades by 
30%; after 48 hours it degrades 
by 60%.2 0 While the 
percen tages vary slightly 
between studies, research has 
proven tha t if, dur ing a 
prolonged crisis, key decision-
makers remain awake beyond 
24 hours, then it is reasonably 
clear that despite their best 
efforts to perform well, their 
decision-making ability will 
become impaired.21 
Despite the scarcity of 
studies concerning executive-
type decision-making following 
sleep deprivation, Yvonne Harrison and James 
A. Home, in one of the most thorough reviews 
of sleep deprivation research, have highlighted 
several areas for concern.22 These include 
impaired language and communication skills, 
lack of innovation, inflexibility of thought 
processes, inappropriate attention to peripheral 
concerns or distraction, over-reliance on 
previous strategies, unwillingness to try out 
novel strategies, unreliable memory for when 
events occurred, change in mood including loss 
of empathy with colleagues and the inability to 
deal with surprise and the unexpected. The 
impact of sleep deprivation on behaviour is likely 
to be significant in a situation that changes 
rapidly when personnel have to adapt to a wide 
11 
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Old foes meet again in Normandy, 1990: Oberst (ret'd) Hubert Meyer, first general staff officer of 12th SS 
Panzer Division (left); Major-General (ret'd) George Kitching (centre); and Air Vice-Marshal (ret'd) James Edgar 
(Johnnie) Johnson, commander of Canadian Wing of 83 Group, RAF (right). 
range of con t inuous and unpred ic tab le 
developments. Tasks that demand other than 
well-learned automatic responses will be most 
vulnerable. They also found indirect evidence 
of a greater willingness to take risks with 
increasing fatigue. There are clear behavioural 
consequences related to sleep loss with major 
decrements occurring in cognitive processes. 
After 54 hours of sleep loss, subjects had a 
marked difficulty ma in ta in ing efficient 
performance levels on cognitive tasks with higher 
mood and performance degradation.23 From the 
time 4th Canadian Armoured Division went into 
battle for the first time as a formation on 8 
August until Kitching was removed from 
command on 21 August (14 days), the unit was 
in continuous combat operations for all except 
3 days. Even with those 3 days out of the line 
re-equipping and preparing for "Tractable," the 
unit suffered from German mortar and artillery 
fire. Adequate, uninterrupted sleep was almost 
impossible. 
As the Falaise Gap battle dragged on, faced 
with massive casualties, constantly changing 
orders, and a broken command system under 
him, Kitching descended a slippery slope into 
sleep deprivation. In fact, Kitching states that 
for the first three days of "Tractable" and the 
Falaise Gap battles, he did not even have a bed.24 
Not sleeping further reduced his effectiveness 
to command, to the point where by 20 August, 
he was exhibiting the clinically recorded effects 
12 
of someone suffering from 54 or more hours of 
sleep deprivation. His actions on 20 and 21 
August are consistent with someone suffering 
from prolonged sleep deprivation. 
In their book Battle Exhaustion, Terry Copp 
and Bill McAndrew have provided extensive 
research into the numbers and impact that 
psychiatric casualties had on 1st Canadian 
Army. These were very real casualties but 
c a s u a l t i e s which S imonds refused to 
acknowledge. Simonds would never have 
accepted exhaustion as an excuse for poor 
performance from one of his commanders since, 
as Dominick Graham states, he expected his 
commanders to drive themselves as hard as 
Simonds drove himself. Unfortunately, Kitching 
and probably the other 2nd Canadian Corps 
divisional c o m m a n d e r s could not avail 
themselves of the eight hours of uninterrupted 
sleep that Simonds insisted upon each night. 
The brief hours of sleep that Kitching probably 
took would not have been sufficient to sustain 
him, thereby reducing his ability to command 
effectively during the 16-21 August timeframe. 
Recent research has begun to question the 
effectiveness of Montgomery and Simonds in 
Normandy. A key component of this research is 
the debilitating effect that the detailed plans 
issued by both of these commanders had on the 
conduct of the Normandy campaign. Both Bill 
McAndrew and Roman Jarymowycz cite 
8
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Simonds ' lack of armoured training and 
experience as the cause for the failure to get to 
Falaise. In spite of Simonds' glowing reputation 
as the best Canadian general of the Second World 
War, his command decisions in Normandy and 
par t icular ly Falaise mus t be crit icized. 
Depending on two weakened, inexperienced 
armoured divisions to plug the escape routes of 
over 200 ,000 German soldiers was an 
unrealistic expectation and militarily unsound. 
Bradley refused to send three divisions into the 
Gap because he felt they would be overrun. At 
the same time, Bradley felt that he needed three 
divisions simply to guard the American side of 
the Gap.25 Much is made of the fact that 
Montgomery did not reinforce the Canadians 
with units from 2nd British Army. However, the 
opposite side of that argument is that there is 
no evidence that Simonds asked for any more 
units. In previous battles when he asked for 
additional help, he always received it. 
Did Kitching have the correct set of 
competencies to command an armoured division 
in Normandy or from the model perspective, was 
he on the Balanced Command Envelope? The 
answer can only be no. Kitching, from a 
professional military educational perspective, 
had the courses necessary for higher command 
in the Canadian Army. Unlike many of his 
Canadian counterparts, he had attended the 
British Royal Military College in Sandhurst in 
1929 and in 1940 he attended the Staff College 
in Camberly for 6 months. His rapid rise through 
the ranks was extraordinary. Kitching joined the 
Royal Canadian Regiment as a 2nd lieutenant 
in 1939. By 1943, he was commanding an 
infantry brigade in Italy and by February 1944, 
he was a major-general in command of an 
armoured division without any further formal 
education or training. By modern standards, this 
rise through the ranks represents a fantastic 
accomplishment, but in the rapid expansion of 
the Canadian Army in the Second World War was 
not uncommon. 
Kitching had no previous armoured training 
or armoured command experience. He was an 
infantry officer. While it was not uncommon to 
have armoured divisions commanded by officers 
from other branches, Simonds made a conscious 
decision to appoint Kitching to command 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division. Simonds must 
have felt Kitching capable of command; 
otherwise, he would not have made the 
appointment. With the reality of expanding the 
peacetime Canadian Army into a wartime footing 
it would be surprising whether any senior 
officers would have been placed on the Balanced 
Command Envelope. Within 2nd Canadian 
Corps, the infantry divisional commanders 
would have been better placed within the 
The Break Through, near Perrieres, Normandy by Will Ogilvie. 
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Balanced Command Envelope since they were 
infantry officers, in command of infantry 
divisions and had held commands of smaller 
Infantry formations earlier in their careers. 
Kitching did not have this advantage. Where 
Kitching was different from many of his 
contemporaries is in the amount of combat-
related experience that he gained while fighting 
and working with Simonds in Sicily and Italy. 
Even with his unique combination of education 
and experience, Kitching was outside the 
preferred Balanced Command Envelope for the 
commander of an armoured division. 
The respective positions on Kitching's 
dismissal provide some very interesting insights. 
When considering the Simonds' position, 
Graham claims that Simonds was too trusting 
when it came to his subordinates and friends 
because he was inexperienced as an armoured 
commander. By August, he had become 
hardened and demanded that the men under 
his command should drive their subordinates 
in his own impersonal, objective manner. 
Graham states that Simonds sacked Kitching 
because he felt Kitching lacked this hardness. 
Graham further states that in Normandy, 
Simonds demonstrated intolerance for weakness 
in his subordinates and their units whether from 
heavy casualties, inexperience, fatigue, bad 
weather, or unforeseen and changing orders. 
Graham presents an interesting list that seems 
to be targeted specifically at Kitching since it 
conveniently dismisses the factors he put 
forward in defence of his actions. It is interesting 
to note that Graham skirts the entire issue of 
Simonds' performance during the closing of the 
Falaise Gap, arguably one of the most critical 
and highly debated battles in Canadian military 
history, by only dedicating one page to it. 
This sense that Kitching was not "tough 
enough" comes out often in the literature. Had 
Kitching been more ruthless, would he have 
received more out of the troops? The answer is 
not so clear-cut. The 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division was a green division learning its trade 
in an unforgiving environment; it was forced to 
fight at a disadvantage in both terrain and 
weapons. The terrain favoured the German 
defenders and their anti-tank weapons; 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division tank crews were 
also at a technological disadvantage when the 
Sherman tanks are compared to their German 
opponents.26 John Marteinson argues that the 
problems that had occurred in 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division since its introduction on the 
battlefield were, in large measure, the fault of 
Simonds routinely making last-minute changes 
to plans to which battle-inexperienced units 
could not react quickly.27 The 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division never had the same 
opportunity, as did 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division in Italy, of being able to reflect on its 
operational performance in its first battles and 
carry out a deliberate training programme to 
correct apparent faults. Once the Poles and 
Canadians were launched into the maelstrom 
of the Gap, there was little Simonds or Kitching 
seemed able to do to help. Like the remnants of 
20 shattered German divisions, Canadian and 
Polish tank regiments and infantry battalions 
were destined to fight their own desperate 
battles.28 There is no doubt, however, that during 
the actions in the Falaise Gap commanders at 
all levels learned quickly from their first combat 
experiences and showed far better practical 
application of all-arms co-operation tactics than 
in previous battles. 
Kitching states in his book that under the 
circumstances he did not think that anyone else 
could have done much better with the division 
than he did. He also states that it was unrealistic 
for Simonds to expect him to swing his 
armoured division around in the enclosed 
countryside of Normandy in the same way that 
the British 8th Army had when Kitching and 
Simonds had observed these units in the 
desert.29 The changing orders and casualties, 
combined with the breakdown of communication 
and the inexperience of battle, were key factors 
that greatly affected the division's ability to 
function in the first two battles.30 Even though 
casualties severely crippled the armoured 
brigade, Kitching and many contemporary 
authors felt that the individual regiments fought 
well under adverse conditions and without firm 
direction. This belief is consistent for "Tractable" 
and in the closing of the Falaise Gap. 
Roy claims that Kitching lost his command 
because "the promise he showed failed to 
materialize" and he "failed to exercise the 
requisite grip, which can only come from 
personal supervision." Simonds' A.D.C. related 
the following to Professor Roy: 
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...Shortly afterwards General Simonds told me 
what he had done...and that it was the most 
difficult thing he had ever had to do; that he had 
tremendous confidence in him because of their 
close association in Sicily and Italy and almost 
loved him as he would a brother, and admired 
his great courage and personal ability; that he 
found it impossible to understand how things 
in the 4th Armoured had got so out of control. 
He felt he had no other choice than to replace 
him; that lives were at stake and he could take 
no more chances.31 
Had Kitching lost control and, if not, why 
would Simonds think that he had? The question 
as to why and how Simonds developed his 
impression of Kitching is not readily available 
from Simonds himself. Kitching states that he 
rarely saw any staff officers from 2nd Canadian 
Corps at his headquarters. This assertion 
suggests that Simonds would have formed his 
opinion on Kitching through direct observation 
or through contact with 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division units. 
Within this context, a series of scattered but 
recorded incidents involving Simonds and 
Kitching or units of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division probably formed the basis for Simonds' 
perception that Kitching had lost control. There 
is a series of six incidents recorded between 7 
and 20 August that individually do not create a 
picture of someone who had lost control. 
However, when put together with the added 
weight of the anxiety over the fact that 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division was the lead unit 
of the 2nd Canadian Corps attack and it was 
taking so long to close the Gap, one could 
understand how Simonds may have formed his 
opinion. Kitching, in his taped interviews, spoke 
of the enormous pressure that was being brought 
down on him from Simonds and Montgomery 
to close the gap. The pressure to succeed was 
tremendous. But the basic question remains: 
what more might have been accomplished, given 
the command environment, the enemy's 
superior battle experience, their distinctive 
advantages in both armour and anti-tank 
weapons and the tremendous problems that 
Kitching experienced in his first series of battles? 
The incident that probably sealed Kitching's 
fate as General Officer Commanding 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division occurred on the 
evening of 20 August. Simonds once again 
changed the orders of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division and ordered 4th Canadian Armoured 
Brigade to go rescue the Poles. As far as Kitching 
was concerned, the new orders did not make 
any sense and he told Simonds so. Kitching 
responded: "To hell with them. They have run 
out of food and ammunition because of the 
inefficiency of their organization; our people have 
been fighting just as hard but we have managed 
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to keep up our supply system." That was about 
as far as Kitching got because Simonds 
peremptorily ordered 4th Canadian Armoured 
Brigade to rescue the Poles immediately.32 This 
outburst at Simonds' orders to help the Poles 
was totally uncharacter is t ic for Kitching. 
Unfortunately, what Kitching probably did not 
know was that Simonds was with elements of 
the Polish division when the orders were issued. 
Kitching was naturally very shocked and 
emotionally upset at the decision to relieve him 
and made a number of points in his defence. 
The first involved the long delay in sending 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Moncel to command the 
armoured brigade. He also complained that the 
division had had too many changes in orders 
over a period of ten days and had taken very 
heavy casualties in commanders, soldiers, and 
tanks in its first battles. It is interesting to note, 
according to Kitching, that Simonds had no 
rebuttal for either of these points.33 
The issue with Moncel is perhaps the most 
crucial. During the early stages of phase 2 of 
"Totalize" (8 August), Kitching and Simonds had 
a discussion as to who would replace Brigadier 
16 
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Leslie Booth, commander of 4th Canadian 
Armoured Brigade, if he should be injured. They 
agreed on Moncel who at that time was a member 
of Simonds' staff at 2nd Canadian Corps. 
Kitching knew Moncel quite well. When Kitching 
was informed of the injuries to Booth on 14 
August, he immediately asked for Moncel. 
Unfortunately, and for reasons not clearly 
explained, Moncel did not take command of 4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade until the afternoon 
of 19 August. The delayed arrival of Moncel 
forced Kitching to rob his armoured regiments 
of their commanders to provide a commander 
for the armoured brigade. Kitching's most 
talented armoured regimental commander was 
Lieutenant-Colonel D. Worthington, but he had 
been killed in "Totalize." Kitching was left with 
Scott, Halpenny, and Wotherspoon. Kitching's 
second choice was Wotherspoon, the 
commander of the South Alberta Regiment. 
Kitching talked to Brigadier Jim Jefferson, 
commander of 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
about the possibility of promoting Wotherspoon, 
but Jefferson would not hear of it. Jefferson 
argued that it would be fatal to the regiment and 
would upset the whole brigade because of the 
familiarity that had been built up among the 
regiment and squadron commanders.34 What 
was not said at that point was that Jefferson 
relied heavily on the tactical expertise of 
Wotherspoon and Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, 
commanding the Argyll and Sunder land 
Highlanders of Canada in the handling of that 
brigade. It is not clear whether Kitching already 
knew this about Jefferson but it could help 
explain why he accepted Jefferson's arguments 
so easily and settled on Moncel. 
Why did it take five days for Moncel to get to 
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade when he was 
physically no more than two hours away? 
Unfortunately, this question may never be 
properly answered and is crucial in the dismissal 
of Kitching. It seems peculiar that the 2nd 
Canadian Corps diarist felt compelled to make 
an entry in the 2nd Canadian Corps war diary 
on 17 August to say that Moncel was taking over 
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade.35 Kitching's 
r eques t had obviously gone to Corps 
Headquarters but why a three day delay in the 
notation and why did it take a further two days 
for him to get to 4th Canadian Armoured 
Brigade? The frustrating fact is that Moncel 
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proved to be an effective brigade commander 
who could have provided the needed leadership 
to the armoured regiments on the critical day of 
15 August. The replacements that Kitching was 
forced to use proved incapable, for various 
reasons, of handling the job. 
Despite arguments to the contrary, casualties 
within the division were a significant factor in 
its performance. A typical regiment, both 
armoured and infantry, had 38 officers.36 Of the 
officers that began the month of August in the 
armoured regiments of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division, the Governor General's Foot Guards 
had suffered 50% casualties, the Canadian 
Grenadier Guards 42%, the British Columbia 
Regiment 58%, and the South Alberta Regiment 
40% casualties. On average, 48% of the original 
officer complements were casualties by 26 
August or after 14 days of combat. These 
casualties caused a leadership vacuum that was 
compounded by the robbing of the regimental 
commanders to command the a rmoured 
brigade. The worst case was the decimation of 
the British Columbia Regiment where the unit 
lost its commanding officer, adjutant, all 
squadron commanders and rear link captains, 
six lieutenants and 101 other ranks, and 47 
tanks all in one day of combat, 9 August.37 At 
one point, during the advance to Trun, the 
Canadian Grenadier Guards were commanded 
by a captain. Even more compelling was the loss 
of senior officers (major and lieutenant-colonel) 
in the armoured brigade. The casualty rate at 
these r anks was 56%, with the brigade 
commander and two of the three regimental 
commanding officers killed.38 
Casualties among the other ranks are 
another telling statistic. A typical armoured 
regiment had an established strength of 657 
other ranks, while an infantry regiment had 811. 
On 15 August, even after receiving its portion of 
reinforcements the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division was shor t 509 genera l du ty 
infantryman.39 This number represented almost 
an entire regiment. By 26 August, the armoured 
regiments were manned at 85% of their 
established strength and the infantry regiments 
at 74%. It is interesting to note that a typical 
German division of 12,000 men was considered 
used up when its ration strength was reduced 
to 11,000 men or reduced by roughly 10%. Part 
of the rationale for this figure is that the 
casualties were primarily in the fighting echelons 
of the division and not in the support troops.40 
If the same criterion is applied to 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division, the division would have been 
considered used up by 12 August. 
It is i n t e re s t ing to compare the 
accomplishments of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division during the closing of the Falaise Gap 
with the efforts of the veteran British 7th 
Armoured Division during the same time frame. 
Early on 17 August, 7th Armoured Division 
passed through 51st Division with orders to 
exploit success by a drive on the Seine River, 65 
miles away. The division took three days to travel 
nine miles to the town of Livarot, which was 
Photo by H.G. 
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found empty, against opposition that was 
described as slight, consisting of small rear 
parties. The division took another four days to 
travel to the town of Lisieux another nine miles 
away against little or no opposition.41 This effort 
must be compared with the intense combat that 
4th Canadian Armoured Division was embroiled 
in a r o u n d T r u n and Chamboi s . Rapid 
exploitation of the collapsing German position 
elsewhere may have relieved pressure on 2nd 
Canadian Corps. Bradley steadfastly refused to 
send his three divisions into the cauldron 
around Chambois until late in the battle. There, 
in the middle of the Falaise Gap, stood the 
decimated units of 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division. Not only did they have to deal with 
Germans attacking from all sides and thousands 
of surrendering Germans, they also had to 
rescue the Poles.42 Before rendering any realistic 
assessment of success or failure, the actions of 
all units must certainly be compared and placed 
into context. 
The 4th Canadian Armoured Division had 
led the way in the August battles, but as a new 
division it had to learn its business as it fought. 
The division gained valuable experience and so 
did its commander.43 Unfortunately, Kitching was 
never allowed to exercise freely command of his 
division. Pigeau and McCann argue that there 
have been adequate commanders in history who 
have shared the same set of traits as their more 
successful counterparts, but who were less 
successful because of extenuating circumstances 
such as resources limitations, personnel 
differences and adversary competence. There 
has also been a tendency to judge those who had 
not attained greatness as somehow deficient in 
their personal traits and skills, when the 
deficiency, in fact, may not be the case. 
Within the three dimensions of influence of 
the P igeau /McCann model (au thor i ty , 
competency and responsibility), Kitching was 
both competent and accepted the requisite 
responsibility. Kitching had no previous 
armoured experience, bu t few Canadian 
armoured units were commanded by armoured 
officers at the time. Kitching did have valuable 
combat experience from Italy and Sicily and was 
probably as competent as any other officer to 
command 4th Canadian Armoured Division once 
Simonds decided he did not want Worthington. 
Kitching was left to shoulder the blame for 
the perceived poor Canadian performance in 
Normandy; yet, the blame was not his to hold. 
Kitching certainly did fail. He failed to look after 
himself and as a result his performance suffered. 
But, if Kitching failed 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division, Simonds failed Kitching. It was a failure 
on Simonds' part to not provide Kitching with 
the resources he needed to accomplish his 
mission. Moncel arriving to command 4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade on 15 August could 
have had a profound effect on Kitching's 
com m and and the tac t ica l ba t t l e by 
re-establishing the framework of command 
within the division. Effective leadership for 4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade on that date might 
have put 4th Canadian Armoured Division in 
Trun much earlier, thereby closing the Gap 
before the German order to withdraw had been 
given. Regardless, the opportunity to end the 
Normandy campaign early with a sweeping 
victory had been lost on that fateful morning of 
8 August. What ensued afterward was a display 
of ineffective senior Canadian leadership in a 
wasteful slugging match that should have never 
happened and went far beyond the sphere of 
influence of only one divisional commander. It 
can be argued that the lacklustre showing of the 
Canadian army in Normandy for June and July 
rests with the Canadian divisional commanders, 
but the same cannot be said for the battles of 
August. The blame for the August battles must 
rest squarely with Simonds. Given the command 
environment and unfolding circumstances of the 
August 1944 battles, Major-General George 
Kitching and the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division performed much better than they have 
ever been given credit for. In the end, Kitching 
was an able commander placed in an almost 
impossible situation. 
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